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The easTern and WesTern 
“scripTures” for posTmoderniTy: 
ToWard a unified eThos 




Postmodernism underscores the impossibility of discovering any 
truth. One can at best only construct a truth capable of ensuring 
optimal wellbeing for everyone. The traditional undifferentiated 
efforts of science, religion, and philosophy, which became 
compartmentalized in the Enlightenment, are again streamlined in 
postmodernity. A new ethics is the point of convergence for these 
three disciplines to fashion a sustainable universe. Yet Nagarjuna, 
who has long been overlooked, advocates a passage beyond 
language. It is an initiative that finds resonance in some postmodern 
masters as well.
Keywords: religion; science; postmodernism; stories; 
Enlightenment; chaos theory; complexity theory
IntroductIon
It is now commonplace to speak of our knowledge of the world as a 
function of our mapping of the world. The “universe” is fashioned by human 
beings and tells us more about the history of human struggle than truths about 
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the world. The knowledges so produced, whether they concerned themselves 
with the “barbaric” past or “scientific” present, are myths, in the sense that 
Terrence Hawkes defines the term: Myths “represent [people’s] attempts to 
impose a satisfactory, graspable, humanizing shape on”1 an incomprehensible 
world. The shape of the world is a projection of the human mind: “That 
shape . . . springs from the human mind itself, and it becomes the shape of 
the world that that mind perceives as ‘natural’, ‘given’ or ‘true.’”2 However, 
this world building, far from being a unilateral process, is a self-fashioning 
as well, “[f]or not only does man create societies and institutions in his own 
mind’s image, but these in the end create him.”3
The human impulse to shape the world, in retrospect, may be seen 
as a series of constructions—often masquerading as ultimate—in a word, 
paradigms. Jacques Derrida observes that the entire human history “must 
be thought of as a series of substitutions of center for center, as a linked 
chain of determinations of the center.”4 One such paradigm may be said to 
have occurred with the inauguration of poststructuralism in 1966 when the 
status of the truths of the human sciences changed. Virginia Woolf ’s famous 
declaration—“in or around 1910, human nature changed”5—applies more 
to the aftermath of the Baltimore Conference in 1966 where Derrida made 
his remark than to the onset of modernity, to which Woolf was originally 
referring. His pivotal lecture at this conference argued for a shift in perspective 
toward the “ joyous affirmation” of “the noncenter” rather than lament “the 
loss of centre.”6 The event precipitated disillusionment and a reconstitution, 
proferring as it did a decentered universe, one without a landmark or a 
reference point. Derrida and his peers reoriented humanity away from its 
quest for the “discovery” of Truth toward the “invention” of truths, if with a 
certain smugness about themselves having finally caught up with the elusive 
truth about the nontruth.
With the passing of the old certainties, one is left, it seems, with 
tentative, and provisional, truth, and a provisionality that cuts across religion, 
philosophy, and sciences.
1Terence Hawkes, Structuralism and Semiotics (London: Routledge, 2003), 3.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
4Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 1978), 279.
5Virginia Woolf, “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown,” in A Woman’s Essays: Selected Essays 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992), 70.
6Derrida, 369 (italics in the original).
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This paper brief ly surveys the shif ts in attitudes ef fected by 
poststructuralism in Western philosophy, using Derrida as an example, in 
Western religion, using John Milbank as an illustration, and in science, with 
a focus on T. S. Kuhn for introducing a new paradigm. Philosophy, religion, 
and science will be shown to be gravitating toward ethics, specifically, an 
ethics that takes the shape of ecological sustainability in science and one 
that tends towards Levinasian “infinite responsibility” and “radical alterity” 
in philosophy and religion.7 The paper also argues that in spite of the threat 
of nihilism inherent in poststructuralism, one cannot get away from stories. 
The paper then moves on to the Indian philosopher Nagarjuna, who at once 
anticipates many of the predicates of poststructuralism and points to the 
necessity of fashioning a universe through stories. Significantly, Nagarjuna 
moves beyond language yet desists from condemning language.
the uncertaInty PrIncIPle
As religion slowly moved out of life in the West as a reference point, its 
place was taken by science. However, Thomas Kuhn’s widely acclaimed The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions played a significant role as much in deflating 
the hardnosed objectivity of scientific knowledge as in the reunification of 
science and other disciplines.8 Kuhn stresses the perspectival orientation 
of all scientific theories which he argued were firmly related to a specific 
“paradigm” or framework. Truth of a scientific theorem, according to Kuhn, 
was closely related to the subjective position of a community. With Kuhn’s 
book, as Patricia Waugh says, “even scientific theories, therefore, begin to seem 
subject to the kind of historical provisionality more traditionally associated 
with humanities.”9
7“Infinite responsibility” is a term given currency by Emmanuel Levinas to indicate the 
unbounded, if unchosen, obligation that an individual has towards all others in need. “Radical 
alterity” is another key phrase in Levinas to refer to absolute otherness of people from one another. 
See Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969).
8See in addition to Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1970), a hugely influential work on the philosophy of science, Paul 
Davies and John Gribbin, The Matter Myth Towards 21st-Century Science (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1991).
9Patricia Waugh, Literary Theory and Criticism: An Oxford Guide (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), 19.
78
Abraham, “The Eastern and Western ‘Scriptures’ for Postmodernity”
As early as the late 1970s, Jean-Francois Lyotard was describing the 
erosion of the objectivity of scientific knowledge even within the scientific 
community. A political philosopher, he alerted one to the fact that “there is 
something unpresentable.”10 Stephen Hawking, a contemporary embodiment 
of scientific genius, invites the attention of the world to the incomprehensible 
complexities of science. He refers to how “[Q]uantum mechanics, therefore, 
introduces an unavoidable element of unpredictability or randomness into 
science.”11 Such a view gains significance in the wake of a host of theories, like 
the Heisenberg uncertainty principle that disturbs the archetypal dream of a 
deterministic universe conceived by the French scientist Marquis de Laplace. 
The tenor of his argument is that the confidence regarding the knowability 
of the universe through science seems to have considerably slackened as “the 
uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics implies that certain pairs of 
quantities, such as the position and velocity of a particle, cannot both be 
predicted with complete accuracy.”12 Both poststructuralism and science, 
in different ways, refer to the realm of the unknown, a universe governed 
by forces beyond human control and characterized at once by randomness 
and determinism.
Science has hardly embraced poststructuralism, but it has been moving 
in parallel with it. Science has come up with a series of theorems that 
challenge some of the modern, deep-seated beliefs and assumptions about 
life. Among them are chaos theory, complexity theory, catastrophe theory, 
strange attractors, the butterfly effect, self-organization, the wave function, 
the anthropic principle, and the edge of chaos.13
Chaos theory, dealing primarily with non-linear systems, claims that 
natural systems, like the weather, are regulated by mysterious forces. A 
minor variable can bring about a huge effect and hence render unpredictable 
the functioning of such a system. A rather commonplace example is the 
“butterfly effect” which proposes that the beating of a butterfly’s wings in one 
region of the earth could, in principle, generate a storm in a far-off region. As 
10Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoffrey 
Bennington and Brian Massumi (Les Editions de Minuit, 1979; Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1984), 15. Citations refer to the Manchester University Press edition.
11Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to Black Holes (Toronto: 
Bantam Books, 1988), 60.
12Ibid., 182.
13For an overview of these theories, see Stuart Sim, “Chaos Theory, Complexity Theory 
and Criticism,” in Introducing Criticism at the 21st Century, ed. Julian Wolfreys (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2002), 89–105.
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randomness and determinism are simultaneously present, weather prediction 
becomes predictable as well as unpredictable.
Catastrophe theory casts doubt on the depth of our knowledge of the 
world. For instance, Benoit Mandelbrot says that our measurement of coast 
line is only a rough approximation and that it is impossible to have a precise 
estimation. The reason, as Stuart Sim observes, is that it is nearly impossible to 
go into such a minute level.14 The most one can have is a rough approximation 
of natural systems.
Complexity theory posits that natural systems are characterized by self-
organization. It views self-organization as inherent to all systems emerging 
spontaneously, whereby a given system is taken to the next level of complexity 
unmediated by human handiwork. It is generally believed that systems and 
subsystems such as the universe, humanity, flora, and fauna, get self-organized, 
though rather in an unpredictable direction when they reach what is generally 
known as the “edge of chaos.” Besides, the theory holds that the universe is 
such a system and that by extension, everything in it, including the human 
consciousness, is governed by the very same principle of self-organization. 
Such a view problematizes as much the issue of human autonomy as the 
vaunted power of human intervention in the phenomenal world. Closely 
related to the complexity theory is the strong anthropic principle which 
views the world and its contents as a system in process and flux continuously 
evolving, if in unpredictable directions.
These theories belie the totalizing claims of science. The uncertainty 
principle is most pronounced in quantum physics, which is the most 
prestigious of the disciplines. Lyotard adds, “a scientist is before anything 
else a person who ‘tells stories’”15 that insist on evidence. However, the only 
life-bestowing mantra one can have for such stories is ecological sustainability 
whether it is science, technology, or any such system. Lyotard says that science 
may be like philosophy. It “is producing not the known, but the unknown.”16 
Such a perspective would have far reaching implications for one’s life (and 
death). The new physics subverts beliefs regarding the way the universe 
works. In other words, as ordinary laws of science stand suspended, one 
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Postmodern PhIlosoPhy:  
ethIcs as FIrst PhIlosoPhy
This sense of a universe at once random and determined has called forth 
new attitudes in religion and philosophy as much as in science. One finds 
religion and philosophy converging on ethics. Given a decentered universe, 
the natural corollary is for one to look for guidance in the business of living, 
and that is the realm of ethics. The ethical concern is paramount, undeniably 
so, towards the end of the careers of the great masters of poststructuralism 
like Foucault, Derrida, and many others.
This trajectory is exemplified by Jacques Derrida in the two orientations 
of his thought, best elaborated in his book The Gift of Death (1992), that 
are germane to ethical and religious postmodernism. The first orientation is 
his philosophical theology based on the notion of “différance” and exclusive 
of the metaphysics of presence. Différance, being the ungrounded ground, 
as it were, which can never be erased or realized, offers a more liberating 
notion of “God.” God as pure and endless difference would remain out 
of reach, as it is difference ad infinitum. Pure difference renders God 
ineffable and a sort of nonlocus; thus, it steers clear of the tyranny of one 
meaning. The second orientation is a commitment to the world described as 
“infinite responsibility.”
The Gift of Death dwells extensively on the ethical resonance of the 
Biblical story of Abraham the patriarch, who was enjoined by God to 
sacrifice his son Isaac. The book describes God as the tremendous mystery 
(mysterium tremendum) and as wholly other. God as the wholly other, says 
Derrida, demands absolute obedience and commands Abraham to transgress 
the conventional idea of what is ethical. Such absolute responsibility binds 
Abraham to do something apparently irresponsible and incomprehensible, 
that is, murdering one’s own child. Derrida here draws an identity between 
the exigency of one in need and God’s own command. He goes on to say that 
all the others are to be treated as equivalent to God:
God as wholly other is to be found everywhere there is something of the wholly 
other. And since each of us, everyone else, each other is infinitely other in its 
absolute singularity, inaccessible, solitary, transcendent, non-manifest . . . 
then what can be said about Abraham’s relation to God can be said about my 
relation . . . to every other (one) as every (bit) other . . . in particular my relation 
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to my neighbor or my loved ones who are as inaccessible to me, as secret and 
transcendent as Jahweh.17
Derrida argues that every other is to be treated as wholly other (i.e., God-like) 
and hence every other demands absolute responsibility (i.e., self-sacrifice). 
The ethics based on nationality, race, class, and gender is unacceptable for 
him, and he advocates absolute duty toward the other. When one performs 
one’s absolute duty towards another, one is rewarded by God. However, 
for Derrida, God is far from the conventional, transcendent God of Judeo-
Christian tradition which he describes as “idolatrous stereotyping.”18 Instead, 
remarkably enough, in one stroke, God and conscience merge in Derrida. His 
concept of God appears to run strikingly close to advaitic Indian thought 
when Derrida says, “. . . once there is secrecy and secret witnessing within 
me, then what I call God exists, (there is) what I call God in me, (it happens 
that) I call myself God . . . God is in me, he is the absolute ‘me’ or ‘self ’, he 
is that structure of invisible interiority . . . .”19 The mainstream nondualistic 
(advaida) Indian thought views the Absolute and the individual souls as One. 
The famous dicta such as “I am God” (aham brahmah asmi) and “That thou 
art,” that is, you are God (tat tvam asi), point to the identification of God 
and the universe, though this relationship is interpreted variously by different 
schools. However, the resemblance here between Derrida’s orientation and 
advaida appears to be rather superficial.
Postmodern relIgIon?
In the midst of the many manifestations of postmodern religion like 
syncretic sects, esoteric systems, and reactionary outfits, one can identify 
two broad directions which are at once related and oppositional, namely, the 
postsecular theology in Europe and fundamentalism on a global level. The 
postsecular is both a return to the premodern as well as an attempt to embrace 
the postmodern. It claims to make a just critique of the project of modernity, in 
which the belief that reason would bring happiness to everyone turned out to 
be an illusion after all. The postsecular would join forces with postmodernism 
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in its denunciation of reason, even though it is privileging a premodern 
centrality —almost a return to traditionalism—that clashes with some of the 
core tenets of postmodernism. As Sue Pamela Anderson explains:
Despite twentieth-century postmodern critiques of religion as a western 
conception, twenty-first century critiques focus on what had been readily 
accepted as the opposite of the religious—the secular—by modern western 
Christians and by those who, in response to the postmodern, assumed a post-
secular point of view. An irony emerges here for the (modern) concept of 
religion: post-secular perspectives on the secular, as well as on “the philosophy of 
religion” resemble ideas much closer to premodern thought—even to medieval 
Christianity—than to contemporary thinking in other fields of postmodern 
study of religious or other lived experiences.20
The second direction it takes is fundamentalism, which has a global sweep 
involving not only Islam, but Christianity, Judaism, and Hinduism among 
others. Whether postmodern fundamentalism is a reaction to postmodernism 
or it is its offshoot has been a point of contention. Anderson says that it is 
both: “Arguably, then, religious fundamentalism could be read as an offshoot 
of postmodernism itself even while claiming to be in opposition to it.”21 
John Milbank searches as well for a new set of coordinates conforming to 
the new society and a postmodern religion rather than advocate for a naive 
return to traditionalism.22 Milbank, the pioneer of the movement called 
Radical Orthodoxy, tries to accommodate the opposing claims of faith and 
postmodernism while condemning the project of modernity and its insistence 
on reason. His approach promotes a return to premodernity, critiques modern 
philosophy, conveys his affinity to postmodernity, and asserts his ethical 
orientation. He takes the great Christian critics of the Enlightenment, like 
Hamann and Jacobi, to demonstrate “insistence on knowledge only ‘by 
faith,’ whereby we allow that the visible affords some clue to the invisible, 
[which] alone prevents nihilism, and at the same time ensures that sensory 
desire is neither denied nor hypostasized . . . .”23 According to Milbank, “to 
20Sue Pamela Anderson, “Postmodernism and Religion,” in The Routledge Companion to 
Postmodernism, ed. Stuart Sim (London: Routledge, 2011), 73.
21Ibid., 78.
22See John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1990), 3–6, and Milbank, The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1997).
23John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward, “Suspending the Material: The 
Turn of the Radical Orthodoxy,” in Radical Orthodoxy, ed. John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, 
and Graham Ward (London: Routledge, 1999), 6.
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be human, means, primarily, that we must reckon with an immense depth 
behind things.”24 By embracing the premodern religion he discountenances 
the nihilism inherent in postmodernism. He is critical of modern philosophy, 
as it advocates nihilism, but privileges postmodernism because of its deep-
seated suspicion of reason and because of its insistence on plurality and 
becoming. “The twist added by postmodernism,” Milbank states, “is simply 
that appearances themselves cannot be made clearly present, but are in 
ceaseless flux.”25 Significantly, Milbank centers on the ethical practice of 
gifting, with which divinity is fundamentally identified. He asserts that 
“prior cause remains more fundamentally at work even in lower self-reflective 
intellect, donation as the outworking of self-reflection is still more primarily 
donation, even for Neoplatonism, never mind Christianity.”26
Thus, confronted both by its protean manifestation as well as by the 
necessity of a theoretical rigor, perhaps contemporary religion seems to opt 
for a system that is not based on revelation and faith, but one that gravitates 
towards ethics. Kevin Hart describes this phenomenon as “religion without 
religion,”27 where dogmas, far from being metaphysical truths about Christ, are 
“paradigms by which it is possible to be a Christian,”28 rather than bothering 
either about religious rituals or nuances of theology, when one goes out of one’s 
way to bring solace to the one in need. One recalls T. S. Kuhn’s observation 
about the impossibility of a paradigm-free scientific truth. If so, can one ever 
hope for a religion or a philosophy that is not paradigm bound?
all-In-one
Thus, in postmodernity, one encounters a science grown self-conscious, 
working on its strengths yet aware of its limitations, and a religion, already 
somewhat discredited during modernity, attempting to come into its own in 
terms of ethics. On the other hand, philosophy and religion meet in ethics. 
Hence, religion, philosophy, and science together fashion new paradigms 
24John Milbank, “Knowledge: The Theological Critique of Philosophy in Hamann and 
Jacobi,” in Radical Orthodoxy, 33.
25Ibid.
26John Milbank, foreword to Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: Mapping a Postsecular Theology, 
by James K. A. Smith (Michigan: Baker Academic, 2004), 19. Italics in the original.
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around ecological sustainability and infinite responsibility. Such exploratory 
endeavors, far more than a nostalgic longing for a continuation of the 
Enlightenment dream, may be viewed as a synergic momentum born of a 
new sense of urgency.
narratIves
Such paradigms are underpinned by narratives. Narratives, fortunately, 
are not so much about death as continuity of life, or more precisely, they 
are about resisting the impending gloom of death, as Scheherazade’s were, 
so that she and humanity may have thousands of nights ahead. Indeed, 
precisely because absolute certainties have vanished, narratives are more 
powerful and useful even if there persists the feeling that all our “takes” are 
sort of “mistakes.” There is, however, no such nostalgia and regret in the 
postmodern condition as there would have been in the modern. After all, as 
Lyotard would put it: “In a sense, the people are only that which actualizes the 
narratives . . . by putting them [narratives] into ‘play’ in their institutions.”29 
In a formless world, people can only turn to interminable narratives in store, 
of course, with fabricated forms.
Perhaps, the narrative warranted for a postmodern world is none other 
than an ethics of sustainability and infinite responsibility. If stories require 
form, sustainability and infinite responsibility will lend them the conceptual 
framework for that form to crystallize, even if that outcome only springs from 
the lack of a better rallying point.
narratIves From the east
Narratives have a supplementary character (in its bifold sense), that is, 
they take the place of truth as well as add to the store of truth in history. Some 
of them, rather mysteriously, come to assume a tenacious quality. Without 
the implication of any direct influence of Nagarjuna’s philosophy on the 
European masters of postmodernity, one detects a close parallelism between 
the chief predicates of poststructuralism and Nagarjuna’s thought. One might 
even say, if at the risk of sounding jingoist, that poststructuralism, often 
29Lyotard, 23.
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held forth as a high watermark of Western thought, has only marked time 
in philosophical development at least as far as Indian thought is concerned. 
Without wishing to whittle down the achievement of the postmodern West, 
one might hazard the view that they have advanced little from the second 
century Indian thinker Nagarjuna.
Nagarjuna (CE 150–250), often known as the Second Buddha, is first and 
foremost an antiessentialist who interrogated all the then traditional thought 
systems (Sankya, Yoga, Vaisheshika, Nyaya, Sautrantikas, Sarvastivadins, 
among others), which viewed the world in terms of substance, causation, 
identity, selfhood, and so on. Nagarjuna’s philosophy runs tantalizingly close 
to the thought of Gilles Deleuze whose thought stands out as the most radical 
among poststructuralists like Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Jacques 
Lacan and others.
Nagarjuna’s philosophy, fundamentally, is a scathing critique of both the 
then dominant—Brahminical and Buddhist—substantialist philosophies, 
and the assumptions underpinning them. Such assumptions include the belief 
in the existence of stable substances, unidirectional cause and effect, fixed 
identity and selfhood, atomic individuality of persons, and a certain way of 
liberation. One can see the points of convergence and departures between 
the East and the West in terms of epistemology, ontology, and philosophy 
of language.
nagarjuna’s ePIstemology and ontology
If poststructuralism is a dislodgement of the entrenched Cartesian cogito, 
Nagarjuna’s thought is a demolition of the traditional essentialist systems, 
which are predicated on substance and permanence. Nagarjuna’s theories, 
like those of Deleuze, far from being intuitive or clairvoyant, are empirical. 
Nagarjuna’s philosophy takes off from emptiness (sunyata), by which is meant 
the absence of autonomous existence (svabhava) rather than nihilism. He 
argues, “In the absence of self-nature, whence can there be other-nature? 
For self-nature of other-nature is called other-nature.”30 “Seeing oneself ” 
(cogito) was a deeply entrenched substantialism that Nagarjuna encountered 
in his time, which he rejected. A substance, he maintains, is one that has its 
own (sva) existence (bhava). A conditioned or a contingent substance is a 
30David J Kalupahana, Mulamadyamakarika of Nagarjuna (New Delhi: Motilal Banrsidass, 
1991), XV 3.
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contradiction, for “How could there be a self-nature that is made?” (svabhava 
krtako nama bhavisyati punah katham).31 In the absence of an unconditioned 
substance, one has conditioned or dependent arising/co-origination 
(pratityasamudpada), a notion that relates to the interconnectedness of all 
things. Yet, one recalls that neither emptiness nor dependent arising is the 
ultimate reality in Nagarjuna.
Self-nature (svabhava) stands rejected because it is not experientially 
known. The same logic applies to the rejection of “other-nature” (parabhava). 
David Kalupahana explains, “Often what he claims not to perceive (na pasyati) 
is self-nature or substance (svabhava) or permanent existence (bhava, astitva), 
what he claims to perceive (pasyati) is dependently arisen phenomena as well as 
dependent arising.”32 This process implies a rejection of both a stable knower 
and a stable known, a position that finds resonance in poststructuralism.33
With regard to ontology, Nagarjuna takes off from the Buddhist dictum: 
“Everything is nonsubstantial” (Sabbe dhamma anatta), including the elements.
Significantly, Nagarjuna does not reject the reality of the phenomenal world 
even as he steers clear of all absolutist positions. Nagarjuna does not say “All 
is empty” (sarvam sunyam) but “All this is empty” (sarvam idam sunyam).34
language In nagarjuna
Nagarjuna does not dwell extensively on language as such as 
poststructuralists do, yet, if one is to piece together the scattered remarks in 
his writings, a cogent case can be made about his view on language. He uses 
three terms to refer to language, namely, paramartha, samvrti, and nirvikalpa, 
often translated as “ultimate reality,” “language,” and the “nonconceptual,” 
respectively. Such a rendering of the terms would give the sense of essentialism. 
However, far from being isolated entities, they are so interdependent that the 
ultimate truth does not transcend the ordinary. For Nagarjuna, that one 
finds no “unbridgeable chasm between samvrti or vyavahara on the one hand 
and paramartha on the other is clearly expressed in his famous statement 
31Ibid., XV 2. 
32Ibid., 82.
33See Gilles Deleuze’s concept of “transcendent empiricism” and his valorization of 
conditions rather than causality in Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. 
Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (London: Verso, 1994), 212.
34Kalupahana, 86.
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that without the former the latter is not expressed (vyavaharam anastritya 
paramartha na desyate XXIV).”35 In his Vigrhavyavartani, Nagarjuna refers to 
language as a tool to be used with clear perception of its nature. He implies 
that because of its emptiness, language is non-referring, yet useful. For 
instance, he posits, “Where someone said, ‘a name has a referent’, one would 
say ‘then substance exists’”; you have to reply, “we do not assert a name of this 
kind.”36 In the same treatise he observes how “speech makes the nonexistent 
known, it does not refute it.”37
This argument has profound bearing on language and ethics in 
Nagarjuna. Firstly, his theory of emptiness (sunyata) is incompatible with 
the traditional view of the world as “always already” or a ready-made world. 
Secondly, as nothing in the world has intrinsic nature (svabhava), they have 
to be textualized and structured by human beings. Nirvana then is to know 
that the world without intrinsic nature is being shaped constantly. Finally, 
in the absence of an ultimate truth, the linguistically mediated world is not 
dismissed as a distortion, precisely because a distorted world presupposes a 
“true” world, which, for Nagarjuna, is nonexistent. The absence of intrinsic 
nature (svabhava) and emptiness are not characteristics of things as such but 
only a corrective to the human habit of attributing qualities to things.
Here, language comes to have a place in the scheme of the middle way, 
of nirvana, as it is positioned between the extremes of absolute emptiness 
of everything and things believed to have intrinsic nature: “Thus when 
the Buddha and Nagarjuna emphasized the renunciation of all views 
(sarvadrsti prahana), they were insisting on abandoning all forms of dogmatism 
with regard to views.”38 Non-attachment to views is something other than 
“no views.” Hence, linguistic mediation through stories receives due regard 
in Nagarjuna’s philosophy.
If nuances are played down, one f inds that poststructuralism and 
Nagarjuna’s Buddhism are radical in terms of their antiessentialism, 
antifoundationalism, and antihumanism. Indeed, writers like Magliola and 
Coward view Nagarjuna as more radical than Derrida. Coward asserts, 
“Nagarjuna employs the same logical strategy and often the very same 
35Ibid., 89.
36Nagarjuna, Vigrahavyavartani: The Dispeller of Disputes, trans. and commentary by 
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argument as are later used by Derrida.”39 Magliola, Coward explains, identifies 
Nagarjuna’s concept of sunyata (lack of being or identity) as “equivalent with” 
Derrida’s différance but concedes that Nagarjuna, with his concept of “beyond 
knowing,” is able to transcend “Derrida’s quandary concerning entrapment 
in language.”40
Coward also refers to the study by Loy who concludes that Nagarjuna is 
able to transcend the “self-imposed limits” of Derrida, as Nagarjuna is “more 
systematic in his critique of all metaphysical views than Derrida.”41 Loy is of 
the view that while “Derrida remains stuck in language,” Nagarjuna is able 
to move “beyond language and its dualistic entrapments.”42
Notably, the most significant and radical element here is Derrida’s 
“apparent entrapment within language” as against Nagarjuna’s realization of 
an experience “beyond language.”43 Obviously, while Derrida’s realization of 
truth, even when it is a truth about the nontruth, is through language and 
differance, Nagarjuna at once valorizes and bypasses all language. One recalls 
that Nagarjuna not only sets great store by the Buddhist scriptures but also 
has his treatises including the nonpareil Mulamadyamakarika in language. 
Besides, Buddhism, unlike many other religions, has a surprisingly large 
number of scriptures in Pali, Sanskrit, Chinese, and Tibetan.
Importantly Buddhism, with no revealed scripture (unlike either the Vak 
in the Brahminic system or logos in the Judeo-Christian dispensation), views 
language as purely instrumental, and is far from according language, scriptural 
or otherwise, any intrinsic worth. For Nagarjuna, all words, including those 
of the Buddha, are merely imaginary constructions (vikalpa), giving access 
to, nor obstructing, no reality.44
According to Nagarjuna, language cannot give us reality, yet there 
is no ultimate reality to be found outside language. Interestingly, both 
Derrida and Nagarjuna engage the notion of silence. While Derrida reaches 
silence in and through the medium of language, Nagarjuna transcends it. 
Coward explains, “For Nagarjuna, language is empty of reality and must 
be transcended for reality to be realized. By contrast, Derrida sees language 
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to be rooted in reality.”45 And if the Buddha’s own response, as the legend 
goes, was silence, notwithstanding its varied interpretations, with regard to 
metaphysical questions, silence is perhaps not the least option before us in 
postmodernity. Besides, there is a time-hallowed Eastern tradition of valorizing 
silence. However, Nagarjuna does not particularly hold forth silence, which 
is suggestive of an attitude that accords as much significance to narrative 
as it accommodates an ethos of emptiness (sunyata) to fabricate a world. 
Notably, ethical concern is not ignored in Nagarjuna. So goes his precept in 
his Ratnavali: “So long then as the doctrine that destroys the misconception of 
an ‘I’ is not known, take care always to practice giving, ethics, and patience.”46 
After all, like the person wounded with a poisonous arrow—a metaphor for 
human existence—in the Buddha legend, the immediate concern is to bring 
solace to the sufferer rather than the details concerning the arrow.
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